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Abstract: Due to the dominance of coal in China’s energy mix, coal prices have always 
been a challenge part of pricing reform. The recent frequent government interventions raise 
the key research questions: what is the actual impact of price policies on coal price 
fluctuations, and how can forward-looking pricing policies be made. By proposing a novel 
classification of coal pricing policies and introducing an expectation and forward-looking 
coefficient, the paper examines the relationship between coal price fluctuations and pricing 
policies using the generalized method of moments (GMM) method. It shows that the 
lagging coal price and coal demand play a positive role in regulating coal prices, while coal 
supply and marketization have significantly negative effects on coal price fluctuations. The 
heterogeneous impacts of price policies are due to differences in market players’ 
expectations, policy instruments and the method of policy release. In addition, China’s coal 
pricing policy portfolio from 2013 to 2016 exerted synergy effects on the restraint of coal 
price fluctuations. As the forward-looking coefficient was considerably low, the 
government's intervention behaviors were obviously biased towards ex post facto 
responses. The paper suggests short run and long run policy to advance marketization of 
coal prices amid the energy transition. 
Key words: coal; price fluctuations; pricing policy; forward-looking coefficient; GMM 
model; China 
 




Over the past few years and installment of the current leadership, energy pricing reform 
has been highlighted in China’s national reform agenda. According to the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in November 2013, the Chinese 
government will not intervene in any prices (except network prices) that can be 
determined by the market (18th Central Committee of CPC, 2013). The “Energy 
Revolution” announced by President Xi Jinping in June 2014 further demanded 
restoration of the commodity characteristic of energy products and the establishment of 
market- based energy pricing mechanisms. More action plans have subsequently been 
released by the State Council. 
Though China has accepted the status of a market economy, pricing policies are still 
used and their frequency is particularly high in China’s coal industry. Give the 
significant of coal in China’s energy mix, marketization of coal prices has a wide impact 
on economy and thus reform of coal prices is still in the process along with the changes 
of coal market. In the "pre-liberalization" stage until the early 2000s, the government 
set a guided-price for coal based on which coal producers and large consumers to 
negotiate their contracts during an annual coal ordering conference (“meitan 
dinghuohui”) . Then in 2005, China liberalized its coal price and let the producers and 
consumers to freely determine their coal prices (Shi, 2009). However, due to the 
importance of the coal industry in the Chinese national economy, the government often 
resorts to policy interventions to keep balance among the economic growth, energy 
supply and industrial development (Shi, 2013; Shi et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018). 
3 
 
According to the CEIC database, China’s thermal coal price maintained a upward trend 
between 2005-2012 due to the  shortage of coal supply. To curb the coal price incrase, 
the Chinese government issued a series of temporary pricing policieso, such as coal 
price ceiling (Zhang et al, 2018).  
However, there has been more frequent intervention in coal prices after 2012. 
Unexpectedly, China's coal prices enterred into a declining path aftater 2012, although 
with ups and downs, due to shrinkage of demand and supply overcapacity. Nevertheless, 
due to some significant changes in the release ministries, many policy instruments have 
been tweaked.1 For example, in order to curb the severe price fluctuations, the State 
Council canceled the dual-track system of coal prices including the contract price and 
the market price in 2012. Then in 2015, “the improving mechanism of coal-electricity 
price linkage” was published by the NDRC to ease the price conflict between coal and 
power companies. Meanwhile the NDRC also jointly issued a “pre-warning mechanism 
for abnormal coal price fluctuations” with other departments, in the expectation of a 
suppression in coal price fluctuations. More drastically, in early 2016, the central 
government put a cap on the working day at coal mines (State Council, 2016), and set 
three-grade responsive measures2 to curb prices (Shi et al., 2018). 
However, past experience suggests that despite being initiated with specific goals, such 
price regulations often lead to outcomes that diverge from the original intentions due to 
                            
1The main ministries releasing coal pricing policies in China include the State Council, National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), National Energy Administration (NEA), State Administration of Coal Mine Safety 
(CMS), China National Coal Association (CNCA), China Electricity Council (CEC) and China Iron and Steel 
Industry Association (CISA). 
2The three-grade responsive measures issued by the NDRC are about three different sets of policies corresponding 
to three different grades, or levels of prices, representing by  the  FOB Bohai rim coal benchmark price (incl. 




the lack of a forward-looking design of policy subjects, policy instruments and 
enforcement mechanisms (Andrews-Speed et al., 2005). A recent study also 
demonstrates that such energy price interventions will cause negative impact on 
economic growth (Shi and Sun 2017). While China’s control of emissions and energy 
transition have necessitated cuts in fossil energy consumption, especially coal 
consumption, due to the need of smooth transition to sustain the e  economic growth, 
coal will still accounts for xx percent of China’s energy mix in 2040 (BP, 2018). Given 
this, how to formulate forward-looking policies to effectively improve market-based 
pricing mechanisms has become an urgent issue in China’s energy pricing reform.  
Studying the Chinese coal pricing regimes is not only important for the development of 
coal industry in China and many other countries. The study can inform further policy 
development on coal pricing, which is lagged behind the national goal of marketization. 
Despite reduced coal consumption in recent years, China’s share of global coal 
consumption expanded from about 30 percent in the early 2000s to 50.7 percent in 2017 
(BP, 2018), and now accounts for around 15-25 percent of global imports (ITC, 2017). 
China’s coal price, which is sensitive to different pricing regimes, affects global coal 
trade and its prices. For example, Australian coal companies recorded increases in 
profits in 2016 due to China’s policy to cut capacity (Bloxham, 2018). 
Despite of the significance of price issues in China’s coal industry, the findings from 
previous studies on the causes of price fluctuations generally lack in-depth analysis of 
policy factors but focus more on market fundamentals. Moreover, the literature on the 
different effects of policy instruments is limited due to data limit, and a great deal of 
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work remains to be done on forward-looking estimations of energy pricing policy with 
consideration of expectations. 
To fill the literature gap, this paper focuses on coal pricing policies, of which the policy 
goal is to regulate prices, investigates their impact on coal price fluctuations in China 
and evaluates the forward-looking level of the issued policies. Specifically, an attempt 
is made to answer these questions: “What are the actual effects of pricing policies on 
coal price in China?”, “are the effects different among different policy instruments?” 
and “how much forward-looking level is the coal pricing policy?” The focus is on coal 
price marketization and the government's direct and indirect interventions. In an attempt 
to better understand the effectiveness of pricing policies on coal price fluctuations, this 
paper opens with an examination of the pricing policies in China’s coal sector and 
establishes a forward-looking coefficient to analyze the heterogeneous effects of 
different policy instruments on coal prices.  
The contributions of this paper are four-fold. First, taking the pricing policies into 
account, we conduct an innovative investigation of the causes of coal price fluctuations, 
revealing the rules for smoothing out price fluctuations for the optimization of China’s 
energy mix. Second, the simulation of the proxy policy variables and GMM model are 
employed to analyze the effectiveness of pricing policy quantitatively, broadening the 
empirical literature of policy evaluation. Third, such a study about the forward-looking 
level of pricing policies is valuable in implementing the marketization of energy prices 
in the future. Fourth, as China is the biggest energy consumer worldwide, the significant 
exploration on price interventions in China’s coal market provides valuable references  
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for energy pricing policy in other countries. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 generalizes the coal pricing policies in 
China and related literature. Section 3 designs the measurable proxy variables of the 
issued coal price policies and develops the empirical models to describe the relationship 
among coal price, pricing policies, coal supply and demand based on the transmission 
mechanism of coal price fluctuations. It then introduces market players' expectations to 
establish a forward-looking coefficient. In section 4, we discuss the heterogeneous 
impact of pricing policies on China’s coal prices and the forward-looking level of 
pricing policies under different stages. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper and 
provides some policy implications for China’s government to promote coal price 
marketization smoothly. 
2 Background of pricing policies in China’s coal industry  
2.1 A brief account of prices and pricing mechanisms 
Coal industry has always been an important support for China’s economic development. 
To help stabilize coal price fluctuations, the government has typically held a coal 
ordering meeting (“meitan dinghuohui”) for the signing of coal supply contracts each 
year. Due to the weakened pressure on supply security, thanks partly to the declined 
role of coal in national energy mix, the reform of coal pricing regimes was gradually 
started since 2005 (see Figure 1). Beginning in 2006 however, the NDRC changed the 
meeting into a coal joint one (“Chan-Yun-Xu Xianjiehui”) among coal manufacturers, 
consumers and transporters, and initiated some measures aimed at market-oriented 
reforms for coal orders (Shi, 2009). This was the beginning of the marketization of coal 
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industry in China. In 2007, the NDRC canceled this joint meeting and stated that the 
marketization mechanism of coal prices would become one of the major changes in 
China’s energy strategy in the coming decades. Furtherly, during the period of 2008-
2011, the NDRC issued a series of temporary price policies to curb the frequent 
fluctuations in coal prices, especially for thermal coal.  
Since 2012, China's coal prices have experienced dramatic ups and downs due to 
shrinkage of demand and supply overcapacity. As shown in Figure 1, the price of 
thermal coal spot price (Qinhuangdao port, 5500kcal\kg) fell from 900 yuan/ton in June 
2008 to 360 yuan/ton in December 2015, and then reached a rapid rebound with a rise 
to 680 yuan/ton at the end of 2016.3 In 2012-2016, the State Council, NDRC and other 
energy administrations implemented a marketization price reform for thermal coal and 
other pricing policies to curb the severe fluctuations in coal prices. Overall, the 
government's interventions have been relatively concentrated in the periods of sharp 
price fluctuations. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
 
2.2 Analysis of coal pricing policies in different stages 
With the above background in mind, this paper examines the characteristics of national 
coal pricing policies from the release ministries and policy instruments. Note that the 
government established the National Energy Administration in 2008 and that among 
                            
3 China Coal Resource Database, http://www.sxcoal.com/ 
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several other things, the changes in government organizations may generate an 
endogenous influence on the relationship between coal price fluctuations and pricing 
policies. The pricing policies discussed in this paper are those that were formulated by 
the state administrations between 2008 and 2016. Meanwhile, according to the 
differences in policy instruments, we divided the sample pricing policies into a direct 
intervention stage (2008-2012) and an indirect intervention stage (2013-2016). 
2.2.1 Direct intervention stage (2008-2012) 
In 2008-2012, the coal supply situation in China was generally tight and the 
interventions were conducted mainly in a series of direct price restriction policies (see 
Table 1) such as the coal price ceiling. After the implementation of these policies, the 
rising trend in coal prices seems was curbed. The characteristics of the coal pricing 
policies at this stage were as follows: 
Single-ministry policy: Table 1 shows that the direct intervention policies were issued 
by the NDRC, i.e. a single ministry. Such policies may cost more time in terms of 
information transmission among government departments, and concomitantly affect the 
policies’ influence on coal price fluctuations.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Single policy instrument: The direct intervention policies at this stage were basically 
released after a significant rise in coal prices. The policy tools adopted were mainly the 
setting of a coal price ceiling, indicating that the coal pricing policies in this stage were 
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homogeneous. This provides an opportunity to design a measurable proxy variable of 
pricing policies to examine the impact on coal price fluctuations. 
2.2.2 Indirect intervention stage (2013-2016) 
The government began to use indirect policy instruments to regulate the price decline 
between 2013 and 2016. A typical policy was the “Notice on deepening the market-
oriented reform of thermal coal price”(State Council, 2012) issued at the end of 2012, 
by which the government encourage coal enterprises to sign medium- and long-term 
contracts with market-oriented coal prices while price restriction policies were 
employed again when coal prices rose dramatically in 2016 (Shi et al, 2018). In general, 
China's coal price policies were characterized by the indirect monitoring of the 
medium- and long-term coal contracts during this period, as shown in Table 2, and have 
two outstanding features: 
Joint-ministry policy: From the perspective of resource integration, the joint-ministry 
policies can, to a certain extent, reduce policy distortions by improving the accuracy of 
market player’s expectation of policy effectiveness, i.e. policy expectations. 
Diversified policy instruments: The government adopted mainly medium- and long-
term coal contracts despite direct intervention still occurred during this stage. This 
indicates that a synergy effect or crowding-out effect maybe active in the policy 
portfolio, which in turn could distort the effectiveness of pricing policies.  
 




2.3 Relevance to the literature  
Examining the changes in China’s coal pricing policies provides good examples for 
studying the debates over the effectiveness of pricing policies in general, and in the 
specific case of China. To date not only have there been few studies on the relationship 
between energy price fluctuation and government regulation, but their findings have 
been inconclusive. Most of the studies on the causes of energy price fluctuations have 
focused on the changes in market supply and demand. Few studies have been carried 
out on policy factors, and the dominant factors affecting energy prices have not yet been 
agreed upon (Ellerman, 1995; Ma et al., 2009; Zhang and Cheng, 2011; Ding et al., 
2017). Kanamura (2009) empirically concluded that the energy supply curve 
determines the characteristics of energy price fluctuations. Wang et al., (2013) proved 
that the impact of changes in coal demand on China's coal prices is larger than that of 
changes in coal supply. Separately, Ma and Oxley (2010) suggested that there are 
significant differences in the co-integration relationship between China's regional 
energy prices and the influencing factors. Unlike the above studies, Adelman (1974) 
explored the influence of policy factors on energy prices. His work has gradually 
attracted the attention of energy economists (Bernanke et al., 1997; Leduc and Sill, 
2004; Edelstein and Kilian, 2009). Besides, other scholars empirically concluded that 
price distortions caused by pricing mechanism, taxation policy and others energy 
policies, would affect China’s economic development and social welfare; this 
definitively proves the role of energy policies in regulating price fluctuations (Wang et 




This paper is related to two broad literatures. One concerns the impact of pricing 
policies on prices. The other relates to the lag effect of pricing policies and the role of 
expectation. First, empirical examination of the impacts of pricing policies on coal price 
fluctuations in China is widely regarded as a challenging task since the released policies 
are mainly categorized into text paradigms and policy instruments (Zhao et al., 2010). 
Oikonomou et al. (2012) qualitatively compared the effectiveness of single energy 
policies versus a policy portfolio and concluded that the latter is not necessarily better 
than the former. Further, Yoon and Sim (2015) analyzed South Korea’s renewable 
energy policies qualitatively and found that different policy portfolios have different 
effects on the price of renewable energy generation. Though the above literature lacks 
the effect analysis of governmental interventions on China's coal prices, it does provide 
a meaningful elucidation of the differential impacts of a single price policy versus a 
policy portfolio on coal price fluctuations.  
Second, there is a consensus that the release and implementation process of any policy, 
including pricing policy, takes time and thus expectation has an important role. Li (2014) 
proposed that the effectiveness of the policy depends on the expectation factors and the 
policy is effective only when the expected change is in line with the policy goal. 
Sheffrin (1996) defined “expectation” as the predictions about uncertain economic 
variables made by the economic subjects. Other scholars proposed that the expectation 
essentially reflects whether a certain policy is forward-looking owing to the economic 
subjects’ predictions following the implementation of pricing policies (Zheng et al., 
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2012; Best and Kapinos, 2016; Zhang and Dang, 2018). And forward-looking policy 
studies of energy price regulation still need more literature support (Lüthi and 
Wüstenhagen, 2012).  
In China, after the government issues coal pricing policies, the market players then 
make the prediction whether the pricing policy will meet its objectives in the future or 
not, i.e. policy expectation, which eventually reflects the forward-looking level of the 
policy. Disagreement over the simultaneous impacts of price fluctuations and market 
expectation, has existed since the 1990s (Kilian, 2009; Liu et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 
2017). Given this, this paper introduced expectations of market supply and demand 
balance and effectiveness of policy, i.e. market expectation and policy expectation, to 
examine the relationship between coal price fluctuations and pricing policies. It then 
chose policy expectation to quantitatively evaluate the forward-looking level of coal 
pricing policies in China.  
3 Methodology and data 
3.1 Proxy variables of coal pricing policy  
In this paper, we analyzed the characteristics of coal pricing policies in different stages 
and found that price restrictions and medium- and long-term coal contracts are the two 
typical instruments used to regulate coal prices in China in 2008-2016. In order to 
eliminate the endogenous relationship between coal prices and policy factors, we 
designed the proxy variables from the above two policy instruments. 
(1) The proxy variable of the price restriction policies 
Considering that the policy objective of the direct price restriction policies (RCP) was 
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to regulate coal price so that it would remain within the targeted levels, we chose the 
Retail Price Index (RPI-X) model, which means that the price deviation of a product 
cannot exceed the difference between the RPI (one of the benchmark economic 
variables) and the ratio X set by the regulator (Weyman-Jones, 1990; Littlechild, 2014; 
Simshauser, 2017). Further, we assumed that without price restriction policies, coal 
price fluctuations in China generally meet the characteristics of a market economy, that 
is, the domestic coal price will change in accordance with the fluctuation of 
international coal prices under the condition that coal can be freely traded. 4 This 
indicates that the difference between the two should tend to be stable along with the 
geographical differences. Conversely, with the price restriction policies, domestic coal 
prices deviate from international coal prices and the difference between the two remains 
unstable.  
To reflect the variation in the discrete distribution of China's coal prices and 
international coal prices, following the practice of Shi and Sun (2017), this paper 
defined the standard deviation of the difference between the two as the proxy variable 
of price restriction policies based on the RPI-X model (Eq. 1). Meanwhile, many 
countries commonly refer to three international benchmark coal prices during the 
process of pricing coal, including South Africa (Richards Bay), ARA port (the 
Netherland) and Australia (Newcastle port) (Haris and Tao, 2016). 5 Papiez and Śmiech 
(2013) found that coal price in Australia (Newcastle port) is the most important factor 
                            
4
 “As the main the largest coal consumer and a major coal importer in the world, China’s coal market is integrated 
with the global coal market.” 
5
 Since the Asia-Pacific region is the major destination of the global seaborne coal trade, 
all three benchmark coal prices are relevant to the Asia-pacific market.  
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in shaping other prices on the Pacific markets while coal prices in ARA port and South 
Africa (Richards Bay) are the Granger cause of prices in the Pacific region. 
Consequently, we adopted the above three international benchmark thermal coal prices 
to reflect the fluctuations of global coal prices. As shown in Eq. 1, icpjt denotes the j 
benchmark coal price in period t, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and refers to domestic coal price in China in 
period t and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 represents the standard deviation of the difference between the two. 
stcpt =  stdev(icpjt − ccpt)                          (1) 
(2) The proxy variable for medium- and long-term coal contracts 
Generally, the pricing policies of medium- and long-term coal contracts (the TCC) are 
recommended to encourage enterprises to sign coal contracts by administrative 
measures. Since the context of the TCC are textual materials, it is difficult to obtain 
quantitative variables directly based on real data. Thus, we employed the context 
analysis method (Bos and Tarnai, 1999; Huang et al., 2011) to mine the textual data for 
developing a proxy variable of the TCC. Meanwhile, it is found that all policy usually 
meets the general rule of diminishing effectiveness6, that is, a policy is effective when 
implemented, and then its effectiveness will gradually decline to zero (Imam, 2015). As 
shown in Figure 2, the related policies of the medium- and long-term contracts are 
issued with different time intervals. Based on the above analysis, we proposed that the 
law of diminishing effectiveness is correspond with the fact that the government issues 
repeatedly the same policy. Besides, Shimizutani (2006) empirically found that the 
                            
6 Note that there are two theoretical reasons for the law of diminishing effectiveness. On one hand, since it takes 
time for the release and implementation of policies, the policy response is usually lagged behind economic 
changes. On the other hand, due to the existence of expectations of market players, the implementation of policies 
often deviates from their goals, which in turn will undermine the policies’ effectiveness. Brainard (1967) proved 
that a structural change for the effectiveness of policy should be related to how it affects the policy-maker's 
performance in meeting his objectives. 
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decrease in policy effectiveness may be rapid and is partly consistent with the 
exponential distribution. Given this, we assumed that the TCC meets the law of 
diminishing effectiveness of policies. 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Additionally, from the textual data of the TCC, a change in the definition of the coal 
contract period also attracted our attention. Specifically, the shortest period of the TCC 
declined from two years in P09 to one year in P13. Regardless of the sharp decline or 
sharp rise in coal prices, there will generally be an intention to default the contracts by 
at least one side of the contracts. In fact, the frequent default in coal contracts always 
has a negative impact on the stability of the coal market, forcing the government to 
adjust the coal contract period.  
In view of the above situation, this paper chose the contract period of medium- and 
long-term contracts as the proxy variable, ranging from 12 to 24 months. Combining 
the law of diminishing effectiveness, we selected the natural exponential distribution 
function to simulate the proxy variable 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 (effective contract period) of the TCC, 
as shown in Eq.2. In the model, when t=1, the pricing policy is released and the value 
of 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 is 24. Then it begins to decline and stays stable until it drops to 12 in the 
same interval. Once a new pricing policy of the TCC is issued again, the above pattern 
of 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 is repeated. Hence, this paper simulates the time series of the proxy variable 
of the TCC (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) seen in Figure 3. 
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cpcpt =  12 ∗ e1−t + 12, (𝑠𝑠 = 1,2,3,⋯𝑛𝑛)                    (2) 
In addition, we also proposed a proxy variable to capture the effect of joint-ministry 
policies. From 2013 to 2016, the coal pricing policies in Table 2 belonged to the same 
type of policies, i.e. notification policy, which means it is reasonable to choose the same 
proxy variable. Hence, we chose the proportion of the number of releasing ministries 
to the total number of ministries (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) following the practice of Sun and Cao (2012), 
to verify whether joint-ministry policies affect the relationship between policy factors 
and coal price fluctuations.  
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
3.2 China’s coal price transmission mechanism and expectation  
To stimulate the relationship among coal price, pricing policies, and coal supply and 
demand, it is necessary to discuss the transmission mechanism of coal price fluctuations. 
In general, China's current coal pricing policies tend to exhibit the behavior of control 
or ex post facto control. Thus, their forward-looking level is becoming a concern for 
the policy makers.  
We proposed that the transmission mechanism of coal price fluctuations is a dynamic 
process that can be described as: changes in market indicators (including coal price, 
coal demand and supply) → pricing policy’s formulation and release → expectations 
of market players → resource allocation of market players → new fluctuations of 
market indicators after the above policy implementation → new pricing policies, as 
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seen in Figure 4. Although the pricing policies cannot be pre-intervened, the policy 
regulation is a continuous process while the major key state-owned coal enterprises that 
are owned and controlled by the central government in China have more market share, 
which to some extent, guarantees some regulatory effect. The transmission mechanism 
is specifically analyzed as follows: 
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
Firstly, as shown in Figure 4, when China's coal prices rise or fall sharply, it is difficult 
to stabilize coal price fluctuations solely through the market mechanism. Thus, the 
central government has tried to intervene by formulating a series of pricing policies. 
Note that differences in the releasing ministries and policy instruments may affect the 
relationship between pricing policies and coal price fluctuations. In 2008-2016, the 
makers of coal pricing policies changed from a single ministry to joint ministries, and 
the policy instruments gradually shifted from direct intervention to a portfolio with both 
direct and indirect interventions. Based on the above analysis, we put forward the 
following hypotheses: 1) choice of direct or indirect intervention affects the effects of 
pricing policies on coal price fluctuations; 2) different policy instruments have different 
impacts on the effectiveness of pricing policies; and 3) differences in the releasing 
ministries affect the relationship of pricing policy and coal price fluctuations.  
Secondly, the release and implementation of coal pricing policies takes time to provide 
the conditions for market players' expectations on market fundamentals and the released 
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policies, i.e. market expectation and policy expectation and the policy expectation is 
employed to represent the policy’s forward-looking level (Sheffrin, 1996; Li, 2014). 
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, market players will make decisions about 
current and future production plans to maximize their benefits. Ultimately, their 
decisions will lead to fluctuations in coal prices. Note that the differences in policy 
instruments may affect policy expectation because on many occasions, the 
consequences of pricing policies maybe beyond policy makers' expectations (Shi et al, 
2018). Given those information, we assumed that choice of policy instruments also 
affects policy expectation of market players and thus affects the forward-looking level 
of pricing policies. 
3.3 Empirical model and estimation strategy 
As shown in Figure 4, the theoretical relationship between coal price and pricing 
policies indicates that coal price 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  depends on 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1  and the expected price 
fluctuation ∆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ in the period t. Based on the expectation theory (Sheffrin, 1996), ∆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ 
is affected by the current coal supply changes (∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡), the current coal demand 
changes (∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 ), the lagged policy factors 7  (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 ) and other control 
variables ( 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ). According to the transmission mechanism of coal price 
fluctuations in Section 3.2, the expectations including market expectation (𝛺𝛺𝑡𝑡−1) and 
pricing policies expectation ( 𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 ) are supposed to play a significant role in 
determining the changes in coal supply and demand in the period t.  
                            
7
 In this paper, we proposed that comparing to the direct impact of pricing policies, other policies seem have an 
indirect impact on coal price as their policy goals are not price regulation (Shi and Sun, 2017). Given this, we took 
the pricing policies set to represent the policy factor. 
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Following the practices of Wang et al. (2013) and Sheng et al. (2014), we put forward 
a vector autoregressive model to analyze the impact of pricing policies on coal price 
fluctuations. The logarithmic function is as follows.  
lnpt =  ρ ∗ lnpt−1 + (1 − ρ) ∗  ln∆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝 
ln∆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝛼𝛼1 ∗ 𝐸𝐸 �
ln∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
Ω𝑡𝑡−1∗Ψ𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
�+ 𝛼𝛼2 ∗ 𝐸𝐸 �
ln∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
Ω𝑡𝑡−1∗Ψ𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
� + 𝛼𝛼3 ∗ ln𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+n + α4 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡   
(3) 
Then, the expected changes in coal supply and demand in this paper is replaced with 
actual values as follows. 
lnpt =  ρ ∗ lnpt−1 + (1 − ρ) ∗ [𝛼𝛼1 ∗ ln∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 ∗ ln∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼3
∗ ln 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+n +  α4 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡] + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 
𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 =  (1 − ρ) ∗ [𝛼𝛼1 ∗ �𝐸𝐸 �
ln∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
Ω𝑡𝑡−1∗Ψ𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
� − ln∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡� + 𝛼𝛼2 ∗ �𝐸𝐸 �
ln∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
Ω𝑡𝑡−1∗Ψ𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
� − ln∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�] 
(4) 
where, 𝑠𝑠  denotes the tth month, 𝜌𝜌 , 𝛼𝛼1 , 𝛼𝛼2 , 𝛼𝛼3  and 𝛼𝛼4  represent the elasticity 
coefficient of 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 , 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 ∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 and 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ; 
𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 refers to the residual value. Due to limitations in the monthly data, ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 
denotes the difference of coal production in period 𝑠𝑠  and period 𝑠𝑠 − 1 , while 
∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  refers to the difference of coal sales in period 𝑠𝑠  and period 𝑠𝑠 − 1 ; 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a set of coal pricing policies and 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = {𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡} based on 
the construction of proxy variables in Section 3.1 and the optimal lag period of 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 is determined by the “goodness of fit” indicators in the regression model of 
coal price; 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = {𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡}  and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  denotes marketization index 
which reflects the concentration level of China’s coal market.8  
𝐸𝐸 � 1
Ω𝑡𝑡−1∗Ψ𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
� =  𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡+(1−ρ)∗(ln ∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+ ln∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)(1−ρ)∗( 𝛼𝛼1∗ln∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼2∗ln∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 )             (5) 
                            
8
 Since China's coal market is not a fully competitive market, different companies have different bargaining 
powers for energy prices, which indicates that energy marketization affects energy price fluctuations (Ma and 
Oxley, 2012; Sheng et al., 2014). 
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Based on Eq.4, this paper derives the expectation value (E(𝛺𝛺𝑡𝑡−1* 𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛)) of pricing 
policies as shown in Eq.5. In the equation, the market expectation (𝐸𝐸(𝛺𝛺𝑡𝑡)) refers to the 
chain of relative ratio of coal stock (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ) to reflect the relationship between coal 
supply and demand; the policy expectation (𝐸𝐸(𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡) ) is assumed to be a uniform 
distribution variable of 0 to 1 and 𝐸𝐸∗(𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡)  denotes the average value of 𝐸𝐸(𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡) . 
According to Eq.4-Eq.5, the closer the value of 𝐸𝐸∗(𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡) is to 1, the closer are the 
expected changes of coal supply and demand to the actual values, then the smaller the 
gap between the actual and expected coal price fluctuations, the better the forward-
looking nature of the policy. 
To overcome potential endogeneity between coal price and coal supply or simultaneity 
issues due to omitted variables, this paper adopted a simultaneous equation system of 
coal price fluctuations and coal supply in the general method of moment (GMM) model, 
following the practice of Sheng et al. (2014). GMM is a parameter estimation method 
with the conditions that actual parameters should satisfy certain moment conditions, 
and a set of instrumental variables in the model should not relate to the disturbance term 
of the explanatory variables. Generally, GMM model is mainly employed in the studies 
with a big sample. However, Egger et al. (2009) proved that GMM Wald-test is 
correctly sized even in small samples, which verifies our monthly data in 2008-2016 is 
also feasible for GMM method in this paper. 
The simultaneous equation system is shown as follows, in which a Douglas function is 
employed in the coal supply equation, and 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 represent the labor and capital 
stock of China’s coal sector, respectively. In Eq.6, the final variables involved in the 
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model include coal price, coal production, coal sales, the proxy policy variables of price 
restriction and medium- and long-term coal contracts, marketization index, labor and 
capital stock. 
�
lnpt = ρ ∗ lnpt−1 + (1 − ρ) ∗ [𝛼𝛼1 ∗ ln∆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 ∗ ln∆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
           + 𝛼𝛼3 ∗ ln 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+n + α4 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡] + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡                  (𝑑𝑑)





The data used to conduct this research were drawn from a variety of sources as briefly 
explained blow. 9  The spot prices of South Africa (Richards Bay), ARA port and 
Australia (Newcastle port), were obtained from the World Bank, while China’s thermal 
coal price was collected from the China Coal Market Database (CCTD). The coal 
production and coal sales were retrieved from the China National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) database. The marketization index is defined by the ratio of output value of non-
state-owned enterprises and non-collective enterprises to the total output, which were 
retrieved from NBS database. On the coal supply side, the capital stock of China’s coal 
sector is evaluated by the perpetual inventory method (Zhang et al., 2018) and the 
monthly data of the capital stock and coal sectoral employees in 2008-2016 were 
extracted from the CEIC database. As for the expectation factors, the coal inventory in 
China was obtained from the CCTD. The time trend regression method was used to 
simulate the missing value, which was not yet announced at the time of writing. All of 
the data were calculated using Eviews software and were adjusted by the Census X-12 
                            
9
 Note that after liberalization of coal prices in 2005, the Chinese government reformed its governance structure 
by establishing the National Energy Administration in 2008. To avoid the impact of the above institutional reform 
on coal price fluctuations, this paper selects monthly data of relevant variables from 2008 to 2016, resulting a total 
of 108 samples. 
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seasonal method shown in Figure 5. 
4 Results and discussion 
In this section, we report the estimation results of price restriction policies and coal 
contracts policies respectively and then display the estimation of a portfolio that 
includes both policies. Lastly, we discuss the forward-looking policy efficient and 
robustness check.  
Since most economic variables are usually in non-stationary sequences, we first 
checked the stationarity of the logarithmic coal price and other variables to avoid a 
heteroscedasticity issue (Cui and Wei, 2017). The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test 
shows that apart from the coal price (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡), the proxy variable of the TCC (𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡), 
marketization index (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡), the labor (𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡) and capital stock (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) of 
China’s coal sector are stationary series; three variables are first order difference 
stationary, including coal production (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ), coal sales (𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ), and the policy proxy 
variable of the RCP (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡).10 Therefore, we put the first-order difference of the three 
variables in Eq.6 and adopted the GMM method to examine the impact of pricing 
policies on coal price fluctuations in China. 
 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
4.1 Effect of the price restriction policies 
                            
10 Due to limited space, the results of the ADF test, following the Cointegration rank test are not provided. Please 
ask the author for the results if necessary. 
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To avoid spurious regression, we performed the Granger Causality Tests and the 
Cointegration Rank Test, which indicated that there is a cointegrating equation at the 
0.05 level. Then we carried out a simulation of coal price fluctuations with the lagging 
coal price and lagging independent variables as the instrument variables. The estimation 
results are shown in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
As shown in Function (a) of Model 1, since their coefficients are all positive at the 1% 
level, it is clear that the lagging coal price and coal demand play an important role in 
determining coal prices. The optimal lag period of the price restriction policies is set at 
one month according to the values of R-squared and Durbin-Watson, which implies the 
price restriction policies play a quick role in regulating coal prices. Meanwhile, in 
Function (b), the regression results of coal supply show that both labor and capital 
stocks provide positive guidance for coal supply while the current increase in coal 
prices will stimulate a rise in coal production, and then the added production will cause 
the future coal price to decline since the coefficient of 𝐷𝐷(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) is negative at the 1% level, 
satisfying the general rules of microeconomics.  
The key value of interest, namely the policy effectiveness, is demonstrated. However, 
the actual effectiveness of the price restriction policies was not as good as expected 
because the absolute value of the coefficient of 𝐷𝐷(𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(1)) (about -0.022) is the 
smallest. A possible explanation is that the price restriction policies are short-term 
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policy tools by setting the coal price ceiling directly and in the long term, the 
effectiveness of the RCP depends on the government’s monitoring capability and the 
rebound effect of market-oriented coal prices. This finding indicates that when choosing 
direct price intervention, the government should not only consider the short-term 
response ability of the policy instrument, but also its long-term effectiveness. 
In Function (a), the marketization index has a significantly negative impact on the coal 
price at the 1% level, which means the rising output value of non-stated enterprises in 
China’s industrial sectors can contribute to the decline in coal price due to increased 
market competition, which is consistent with Sheng et al (2014).  
 
4.2 Effect of medium- and long-term coal contracts 
Similarly, the results of the Cointegration Rank Test showed there is a cointegrating 
equation of coal price and coal demand, coal supply, the proxy variable of the TCC 
(𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) and the marketization index at the 0.05 level. The estimation results in Function 
(a) are shown in Model 2, presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 4. Note 
that compared with the single-ministry policy, the joint-ministry policy may have an 
exogenous effect on the coal price. Thus, we introduced the proportion of joint 
ministries (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) in Model 3, shown in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
The coefficients of 𝐷𝐷(𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) and 𝐷𝐷(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) manifest that compared with coal supply, coal 
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demand have a greater impact on coal price fluctuations, as presented in Model 3. 
Moreover, the optimal lag period of the TCC is set at 8, suggesting that it takes an 
average of 8 months for the TCC to regulate the coal price after being published in 
China, which is in stark contrast to the lagging effect of the price restriction policies. 
An interesting finding is that the coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 is positive and quite low (0.019) 
at the 0.01 level, which means that this contractual intervention may not significantly 
curb the coal price fluctuations. There could be three reasons. First, the implementation 
of the TCC has a low efficiency due to the poor policy expectation. Generally speaking, 
indirect intervention does not respond quickly to fluctuations in coal prices with a loss 
of policy information in the implementation process, which generates a deviation from 
the policy expectation of market players and ultimately reduces the effectiveness of the 
TCC.  
Second, the way in which the pricing policies are released may affect their effectiveness. 
Specifically, where ministries jointly publish policies in the formulation stage is a key 
factor. Unlike the finding of Oikonomou et al. (2012), we found that the effect of the 
TCC will be influenced by the joint efforts among ministries. In Model 3, when 
considering the influence of the release method (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷), the coefficient of  𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 (-0.03) 
is negative and is obviously contrary to that in Model 2 at the 10% level, which proves 
that the joint release method has a significant impact on the relationship between coal 
price fluctuations and the TCC. This finding indicates that when improving the coal 
pricing mechanism of medium- and long-term coal contracts, the government ought to 
seek cooperation across ministries to reduce the policy distortion in the price 
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marketization process.  
However, the estimated coefficient of the 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  is positive 0.19 and contrary to 
expectations due to the limitation of the sample period in this paper. As shown in Table 
1-2, the fact is that without considering other types of policies, single-ministry pricing 
policies were used by the Chinese government to regulate coal price fluctuations during 
most of the sample period and this covers up the real negative effect of the joint release 
method on coal price fluctuations. 
The third explanation is that the contracts are not strictly enforced and will therefore 
not have a real impact. As mentioned in Section 3.1, at least one party in the contracts 
has incentive to default. As the government does not have information on the actual 
enforcement, the policy is not likely to be effective.  
4.3 Effect of coal pricing policy portfolio  
Based on the analysis in Section 2.2, the policy portfolio of coal prices, was performed 
during the period of 2013-2016, providing an opportunity to analyze the synergies 
effect of a policy portfolio. The estimation results demonstrate that in Model 4 shown 
in Table 4.  
In fact, the central government has tried hard to reduce its interventions from 2013, 
especially to reduce the local government’s protectionism, for enhancing the market's 
self-determination of coal prices. However, from Models 1-4, the coefficients of coal 
supply and demand had a dramatic downward trend from 2008 to 2016, as well as the 
actual elasticity of the marketization index. This finding implies that the impact of 
policy factors on coal price fluctuations will become increasingly important. 
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Meanwhile, the coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(3) in Model 4 is significant and slightly larger 
than the coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(8) at the 0.1 level, directly proving that different policy 
instruments have different influences on coal prices. Besides, what surprises us is the 
coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(8) , changing from 0.019 in Model 2 to -0.05 in Model 3, 
indicating that the impact of the TCC had been strengthened dramatically when 
considering the pricing restriction policy. In the same way, a synergy effect was 
identified in China’s coal pricing policies from 2013 to 2016, suggesting that in 
regulating coal prices, the effect of a policy portfolio is much stronger than any single 
direct or indirect policies. Thus, it is recommended that the government adopt multiple 
policy tools to improve the effectiveness of pricing regulations. 
Another interesting finding is that the optimal lag period of the price restriction policies 
in Model 4 is three months while it is one month in Table 3, implying that the response 
speed of the price restriction policies in 2013-2016 is obviously weaker than the coal 
price ceiling. But in long-term regulation, the effect of the former (-0.06) is undoubtedly 
better than the latter (-0.02). Hence, the balance between response speed and the 
effectiveness of pricing polices is of great concern to the Chinese government as well 
as to other governments in their attempts to implement energy price marketization. 
 
4.4 The forward-looking policy coefficient 
While in the medium to long run, coal prices should be determined by the market, the 
current pricing policies could be improved through designing a forward-looking pricing 
policy. According to the estimated results in Eq. 6, we can derive the values of the 
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forward-looking coefficient ( 𝐸𝐸∗(𝛹𝛹𝑡𝑡) ) by Eq.5 under three different scenarios 
respectively, as shown in Fig. 6. 
In Figure 6, all the coefficients are below 0.5, indicating that the overall forward-
looking level of China’s coal pricing policies is unsatisfactory as expected due to the 
typical post-event response strategies in 2008-2016. With lagging pricing policies, 
distortions in coal prices can be generated to affect the efficiency of resource allocation 
(Ju et al., 2017; Shi and Sun, 2017). While China’s coal industry is looking for new 
interests to meet the needs of the energy transition, the increasingly frequent 
fluctuations in coal prices is also severely challenging the forward-looking level of 
pricing policies.  
Meanwhile, the difference in the values of E1 and E2 indicates that the forward-looking 
level of indirect intervention is much better than that of direct intervention, proving that 
the choice of the policy instruments directly affects not only the effectiveness but also 
the forward-looking level. Further, the value of E3, a significant increase over the value 
of E2, shows that the release method also has an obvious impact on the forward-looking 
level of pricing policies and thus meets the theoretical expectations in this paper. 
Additionally, this paper found that the government needs to balance the effectiveness 
and foresight of coal pricing policies. In details, although the value of E4 is obviously 
smaller than that of E2, the synergy effect of the policy portfolio in Model 4 was clearly 
better than that of single price policy in Model 2. This finding seems to produce a 
pseudo-proposition for the government to pursue forward-looking and effective pricing 
policies. Indeed, the effectiveness of any policy can be affected by its formulation, 
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publication, and implementation. During the formulation of coal pricing policies, we 
suggest that policy makers focus on the policy’s forward-looking level, and then to 
improve its effectiveness in the implementation process by optimizing the linkage 
mechanism of multiple departments. 
 
[Insert Figure 6] 
 
4.5 Robustness check 
To test the robustness of the regression results, we used the coal price index (based on 
January 2011) as the dependent variable instead of thermal coal price. The simulated 
results of the conductive direction of independent variables obtained by the same 
regression techniques are similar to those we derived from the regression model for 
thermal coal price, and there is a little variation in the coefficients of all the variables. 
Thus, our findings are robust to alternative measures of coal price. 
5 Conclusions and policy implications 
Price fluctuations are regarded as the key driver of the interventions. Although the 
Chinese government has been liberalizing its market in recent years, the coal industry 
has been subject to frequent price interventions. The apparent contradiction provides a 
case for interesting academic investigation that has important implications for China’s 
coal industry, and also for the coal industries of other countries.  
In this paper, we introduced market players’ expectations in the transmission 
mechanism of coal price fluctuations in China to derive the relationship between coal 
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price fluctuations and pricing policies. We also separated coal pricing policies spanning 
the 2008 to 2016 period into two stages and proposed a novel measurement of different 
pricing policies. Then we built simultaneous equations for coal price and coal supply 
and innovatively constructed a forward-looking coefficient to evaluate different coal 
pricing policies in 2008-2016. Lastly, we measured and analyzed the impacts of 
different pricing policies on coal price fluctuations employing the GMM method and 
discussed the forward-looking level of coal pricing policies, leading to new path 
explorations for price intervention in coal and other energy sectors.  
The estimation results proved that different pricing policies in China have had different 
impacts on coal price fluctuations due to differences in market players’ expectations, 
policy instruments and the release method. Moreover, this paper empirically concluded 
that the policy portfolio from 2013 to 2016, to some extent, amplified the impact of 
pricing policies on coal price fluctuations. The above results answer the first two 
questions raised in this paper and several key findings included: firstly, both the lagging 
coal price and coal demand have a significant positive impact on coal price fluctuations, 
while coal supply and market integration play a negative role in regulating coal prices. 
Secondly, when considering the joint release method, the pricing policies of medium- 
and long-term coal contracts have an inhibitory effect on prices with an average lag 
period of 8 months. When considering the combination between direct and indirect 
interventions, the synergy effect of a policy portfolio is generated to regulate coal prices, 
and the effectiveness of both price restriction and coal contracts policies has also been 
strengthened. Thirdly, the long-term effects of different price restriction policies in 
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regulating coal prices are different while the coal price ceiling is identified as a fast-
responding policy tool with the lag period of one month. Fourthly, while policy factors 
play an increasingly important role in China from 2008 to 2016, the impact of market 
factors on coal price fluctuations is weakening, which suggests that despite aiming for 
overall liberalization of prices, coal prices in China have been increasingly distorted by 
policy interventions. Lastly, the forward-looking level of China's coal pricing policies, 
relatively low as expected, is proved to be affected by the choice of policy instruments.  
Our study suggests that while pricing policies may be necessary for controlling coal 
price fluctuations amidst China's energy transition, it is not realistic to rely on the 
current pricing mechanism and the Chinese government need to advance marketization 
of coal prices amid the energy transition. Further, the government should improve the 
design of the forward-looking pricing policy with the balance between quick response 
and long-term effectiveness. That is, the government can prepare a long-term effective 
policy instrument during the process of coal pricing to keep coal market in good order 
to a quickly responsive tool in monitoring coal prices to prevent market failures. 
In the short term, for improving the forward-looking level of China's coal pricing 
policies, the policy instruments should be designed to reflect market fundamentals 
instead of stabilizing energy prices, just as a market-oriented price does. Moreover, with 
its inhibitory effect on prices, the policy of medium- and long-term contracts could be 
useful in building stable market expectation. One possible way to improve the 
contractual arrangement is to adopt market-determined “benchmark prices” as the 
transaction prices. Besides, due to the synergy effect of a policy portfolio, coordination 
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among ministries and combination of various policy instruments are also necessary to 
improve the effectiveness of current pricing policies. Lastly, except for the significant 
impacts of pricing policies on coal price fluctuations, other policies such as industrial 
adjustment policies and environmental regulation policies, seems to have indirect 
influence on coal prices (Shi and Sun, 2017). It suggests that the government needs to 
coordinate the pricing policies with the policies for protecting economic growth and 
environment development.  
Although we suggest to improve the effectiveness of policy intervention on pricing, we 
do not deny that in the medium- to long term, the government could abolish coal price 
interventions in line with the current overall national economic reform agenda (18th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2013). This long-term strategy in 
regulating coal prices is consistent with several scholars’ work (Wang et al., 2009; Cui 
and Wei, 2017; Shi and Sun, 2017). In order to mitigating unreasonable price 
fluctuations under a liberalized price environment, the pricing mechanism should be 
well developed to reflect market fundamentals. The government is suggested to make 
continuous efforts to improve market transparency by installing and implementing 
markets rules, aiming to let coal prices to be determined by market fundamentals. Lastly, 
further development of a derivative market in China’s coal industry is needed to add 
liquidity to the market, to generate efficient market prices and to provide an instrument 
of market players to manage price risks. 
Two caveats need to be highlighted and could be directions for  future studies. On one 
hand,we only considers a limited number of impact factors. Other policies whose may have 
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indirect impact on  coal price, such as coal capacity cut policy, could be further added 
to our model. On the other hand,  the policies were not quantitated  and the data series 
is limited. Further studies could be made to quantitate policies with extend date series 
overtime. 
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